美国参议院认为网络司令部在开发和采购其功能和平台的方式上存在问题

美国参议院武装力量委员会担心，对美国网络司令部的能力和平台开发没有足够的监督。

在该委员会对2021年度国防政策法案进行讨论的报告中，阐明了该司令部的联合网络作战架构（JCWA）的问题，该架构负责指导网络司令部能力发展的优先事项。

该体系架构分为以下五类：

  • 在军种网络部队的四个网络作战位置使用的通用触发平台。这些平台将被集成到一套全面的网络工具中。

  • 统一平台，它将与合作伙伴集成并分析进攻和防御行动中的数据。

  • 在战略、战役和战术层面上的联合指挥与控制机制，用于态势感知和战斗管理。

  • 支持网络防御并推动作战决策的传感器。

  • 持久性网络训练环境，它将提供个人和集体训练以及演练任务的方式。

该报告表示：“委员会感到关切的是，JCWA组件计划办公室没有进行充分的监督和协调，并认为必须进行有计划的监督，以确保采购优先级和目标与网络司令部的任务需求保持一致。” “此外，缺乏整体系统工程和系统集成权威以及整个JCWA的能力与健全的系统采购做法不符。”

在某种程度上，委员会的关注源于以下事实：军事部门分别充当了许多此类计划和倡议的执行代理人。例如，陆军正在运行持久性网络训练环境，而空军正在运行统一平台以及联合网络指挥与控制。

因此，该委员会将指示首席网络顾问制定一项治理计划，以在2020年12月1日之前对架构进行协调和监督。该顾问将与负责采购和维持的国防部副部长、首席信息官、网络司令部司令和参谋长联席会议副主席进行合作。

该委员会希望治理计划包括一个结构和过程，以使JCWA组件能够适当集成为可适应网络任务需求的系统功能系统。

它还希望该计划具有一种机制，以确保JCWA组成计划办公室能够响应以网络司令部为代表的联合网络部队的需求。

此外，该委员会还对网络司令部如何进行其网络作战进行了研究。

Senate wants more details on Cyber Command’s tools

The Senate Armed Services Committee is concerned there isn’t sufficient oversight over U.S. Cyber Command’s capability and platform development.

In the report accompanying the committee’s markup of the annual defense policy bill, it articulates issues with the command’s Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture, or JCWA, which guides capability development priorities.

The architecture is broken into five categories:

  • Common firing platforms to be used at the four cyber operating locations of the service cyber components. These platforms will be worked into a comprehensive suite of cyber tools.

  • Unified Platform, which will integrate and analyze data from offensive and defensive operations with partners.

  • Joint command-and-control mechanisms for situational awareness and battle management at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

  • Sensors that support defense of the network and drive operational decisions.

  • The Persistent Cyber Training Environment, which will provide individual and collective training as well as a way to rehearse for a mission.

“The committee is concerned that there is not adequate oversight and coordination of the JCWA component program offices and believes that deliberate oversight must be exercised to ensure that acquisition priorities and objectives are aligned to Cyber Command mission needs,” the language stated. “Furthermore, the lack of overall systems engineering and systems integration authorities and competencies for the JCWA as a whole are inconsistent with sound systems acquisition practice.”

In part, the committee’s concern stems from the fact that the military branches individually serve as executive agents to a number of these programs and initiatives. For example, the Army is running the Persistent Cyber Training Environment, and the Air Force is running Unified Platform as well as Joint Cyber Command and Control.

As a result, the panel is directing the principal cyber advisor to develop a governance plan for coordination and oversight of the architecture by Dec. 1, 2020. The advisor is to work in cooperation with the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, the chief information officer, the head of Cyber Command, and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The committee wants the governance plan to include a structure and process to enable the proper integration of the JCWA components as a functional system of systems that can adapt to cyber mission needs.

It also wants the plan to have a mechanism that ensures the JCWA component program offices are responsive to the needs of the joint cyber force represented by Cyber Command.

In addition, the committee has also zeroed in on how Cyber Command conducts its cyber operations.

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